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AND THE REBUTTAL 
Glenn E. Coven 
In the past decade the sophistication of the analysis of the rela-
tionship between income taxation and the passage of time by both 
scholars1 and Congress has increased enormously. Little of that so-
phistication, however, has rubbed off on the courts. In this increas-
ingly critical area, the Supreme Court remains 20 to 50 years out of 
date; the opinion in Indianapolis Power could have been written 
by Justice Jackson. 
That failure on the part of the Court provoked the commenta-
ries of myself2 and Professor Yin. 3 While the areas in which we 
disagree may be of greater academic interest, the areas in which we 
do agree are of greater practical importance and should be under-
scored. Importantly, we agree that the tests ·employed by the 
courts in general and the Supreme Court in particular for distin-
guishing between the proceeds of a loan and a taxable receipt are 
fundamentally defective and require urgent revision. Secondly (al-
though Professor Yin might not put it just this way), we appear to 
agree that debt for income tax purposes ought to mean a receipt 
that is offset by a repayment obligation that bears a market rate of 
interest-and nothing more or less. The difference between Profes-
sor Yin and myself is that for this purpose I would only recognize 
interest that was actually structured into the transaction by the 
parties while Professor Yin would recast their transaction along 
the lines of section 7872 to create interest (at a market rate) that 
would protect the remaining portion of the receipt from tax. 
To explore this point of disagreement, we might examine four 
more taxpayers who otherwise are in identical income tax posi-
tions. Each receives a receipt of $10,000 at time 0, invests the re-
ceipt at a 10 percent return, and disburses an amount equal to the 
' For recent examples, see Thomas L. Evans, The Taxation of Multi-Period Projects: An 
Analysis of Competing Models, 69 Texas L. Rev. 1109 (1991); Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and 
Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 Yale L.J. 1'817 (1990). 
• Glenn E. Coven, Redefining Debt: Of Indianapolis Power and Fictitious Interest, 10 Va. 
Tax Rev. 587 (1991). 
• George K. Yin, Of Indianapolis Power and Light and the Definition of Debt: Another 
View, 11 Va. Tax Rev. 467 (1991). 
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receipt exactly six years later, at time 6. In the absence of taxation, 
each would have gained an identical accession to wealth. Now in-
troduce income taxation-our system of income taxation. Will the 
taxpayers be left in identical after-tax positions? Of course not. 
A's receipt was salary. It will be taxed immediately as will the 
return on her investment. Her disbursement was for fully deducti-
ble educational expenses related to her employment. At time 6, af-
ter her disbursement, she will be left with $3,500. D's receipt con-
sisted of compensation of $4,360 and the proceeds of a discounted 
loan obtained from a Bank in the amount of $5,640. The loan 
transaction is effectively exempt from income taxation;' at time 6 
he will be left with $4,578 attributable to the investment of the 
compensation. On facts that are identical in the absence of taxa-
tion, under our income tax system D would be taxed far more 
lightly than A and that result is appropriate.11 
B's transaction is essentially identical to A's. The difference is 
that B returned his receipt to his employer because it had been 
paid to him in error. Under our system, B will be subject to the 
same pattern of tax as A; thus B will be left in the same after-tax 
economic position as A. 
C is the one who holds our attention. C received an interest free 
loan6 from her employer and the issue 'is whether C should be 
taxed like A and B, or like D, since she cannot be taxed like both. 
That is, should C's unitary $10,000 receipt be fully taxed (and de-
ducted upon repayment) or treated as salary of $4,360 and the pro-
ceeds of a loan of $5,640 and thus only partially taxed? To put the 
• The taxable return on the investment of the loan proceeds will be offset by the accrued 
deduction for the interest payable. 
• Of course, D could be taxed like A. The proceeds of his loan could be made taxable and 
his repayment deductible. In that event, however, the investment of the loan proceeds 
would not generate sufficient income to pay the interest on his loan and thus the loan trans-
action, viewed in isolation, would result in an after-tax economic loss. D therefore would be 
required to use the return on the investment of his salary to pay the interest on his loan. 
If the loan and the salary were viewed together as a unitary receipt, current taxation of 
the total proceeds would not result in an economic loss and thus might not be seen as im-
proper. Nevertheless, we do regard the compensation and the loan as entirely separate 
transactions and, accordingly, would regard taxing D like A to be wrong. 
• Following convention, I refer to such transfers as loans. The issue here, however, is not 
the label attached to the transaction but the treatment of the transaction for income tax 
purposes. On that issue, there is nothing magic about the existence of the repayment obliga- . 
tion. As I sought to demonstrate in my article, if the repayment obligation is not interest 
bearing, there is no reason to exclude the receipt from income. 
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question in context, consider some real world C's: 
-A public utility demands a deposit from certain customers 
which is commingled with its general funds. Deposits are continu-
ally received and returned; the utility is effectively in permanent 
possession of an unrestricted, non-interest bearing pool of capital 
of several million dollars. 
-A custom manufacturer demands a payment before commenc-
ing the construction of the goods ordered, and payment is immedi-
ately spent by the manufacturer on components. 
-A closely held corporation transfers $2 million to a principal 
shareholder, a key employee. The funds are spent on the individ-
ual's consumption and are not repaid until the- death of the payee. 
Upon the payee's death, :the loan is repaid and the funds with-
drawn through the redemption of stock, the basis of which has 
been stepped up to market value. 
While in every ins~ance it would indeed be possible to recast 
these receipts as loans in part under a section 7872-type bifurca-
tion approach, thereby taxing each "C" far more lightly than 
would occur if the receipt were immediately taxable, it is not at all 
clear why we would wish to do that. In each instance the payee will 
derive an economic benefit indistinguishable from the benefit of 
the receipt of income over the period of time in which the receipt 
is retained. Indeed, in general, an interest free advance is a tax 
motivated transaction designed to permit an immediate economic 
receipt but defer the attendant tax liability. Moreover, a deduction 
for the repayment, if and when it occurs, will adequately compen-
sate for C's year 6 disbursement just as it adequately compensates 
for A's and B's. In fact, C's single transaction is not meaningfully 
different from B's or A's but bears little resemblance to D's two 
separate transactions. Should not, therefore, C be taxed like A and 
not likeD? 
Professor Yin's response to all of this is that the niore favorable 
treatment of C is in fact required by the internal logic of the taxing 
system. I disagree. 
Professor Yin begins with the premise that any reciprocal ex-
change of value in which the performance of the parties is sepa-
rated by time creates a loan, either expressly or impliedly. More-
over, Professor Yin evidently accepts what I conceive to be the 
consensus view that the existence of a loan necessarily requires the 
496 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 11:493 
existence of interest. 7 Since interest is present by definition and is 
borne by the borrower, it must also be taxed to the lender. Profes-
sor Yin thus asserts that any system of taxation, such as the one I 
propose, that does not tax the lender on the interest earned im-
properly undertaxes the lender and overtaxes the borrower.8 From 
that beginning, Professor Yin concludes that the correct approach 
to interest free transfers is bifurcation along the lines of section 
7872. 
The assertion that non-simultaneous exchanges of value do bear 
interest is quite misleading. As a matter of economic fact, interest 
is either paid with respect to a receipt or it is not. If it is paid, then 
neither my proposal nor section 7872 have any application to the 
transaction. 9 If it is not, it only confuses the analysis to assert that 
an interest burden is borne in a transaction in which it concededly 
is not borne. Rather, the issue involves identifying the most appro-
priate income tax burden for one ·who· obtains a non-interest bear-
ing receipt. 
The section 7872 bifurcation approach, which Professor Yin 
seems to prefer, proceeds from the assumption that the recipient 
does not bear the economic burden of interest payments with re-
spect to the amount transferred. Given that factual assumption, 
the section then imposes a burden of taxation on the recipient that 
approximates the tax that Would have been paid if the transaction 
had assumed a radically different form: the loan of a lesser 
amount, at a market rate of interest, plus the making of a func-
tionally unrelated payment. The question reexamined in my article 
was whether it made any sense for income tax purposes to con-
struct so elaborately interest free transfers. Presumably, such are-
construction should be undertaken only if the resulting tax burden 
were superior to any alternative treatment of the transaction. 
That, however, is not the case. 
The tax burden imposed by section 7872 on the "borrower" is 
substantfally lower than the burden that would have been imposed 
if the receipt had been treated as immediately taxable income. 
That reduced tax burden is presumably justified by the fact that 
• See Yin, supra note 3, at 474. 
• See id. at 479. 
• For analytical purposes, I am following Professor Yin in ignoring the intermediate case 
of low interest loans. 
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the recipient is now viewed as paying interest and the principle 
that taxing the proceeds of an interest bearing loan is improper. 
But, the bifurcation of the transaction for tax purposes does not, 
and cannot, alter its economic substance: the "borrower" in fact 
does not repay more than was received and thus does not in fact 
pay interest. Accordingly, as I sought to demonstrate in my article, 
there is no justification for the reduced burden of taxation that 
section 7872 extends. Since the "borrower" will retain the entire 
investment return attributable to the receipt, the · "borrower" 
should be taxed in the same manner as any other recipient of a 
non-interest bearing receipt10, notwithstanding the theoretical obli-
gation to repay the principal amount of the receipt at some future 
date. 
Moreover, the logic of the argument that interest must be pre-
sent in non-simultaneous exchanges does not lead to the bifurca-
tion conclusion. That discrepancy appears quite clearly in Profes-
sor Yin's argument that lenders are undertaxed under my 
proposal. Starting with the premise that the transaction is a loan, 
he observes that the capital invested by the borrower is that of the '-
lender and that the lender is entitled to a return on that capital. 
He then asserts that the lender should be taxed as if that return 
had been received (although it was not). 11 If this analysis were 
adopted, however, it would seem to follow that the entire amount 
•• The argument set forth in my article was not that the recipient should be taxed on the 
investment return because he or she retained all of it but rather was that, because of the 
recipient's entitlement to that return, the initial receipt should be taxed as income rather 
than excluded as the proceeds of a loan. See Coven, supra note 2, at 611-12. 
Nevertheless, Professor Yin's ultimate criticism of my proposal is that it would fail to tax 
the lender on the investment return to which it is "entitled" but does not receive while it 
would tax the borrower on the investment return to which it is not entitled but does in fact 
receive. In a commercial transaction between unrelated parties, it is not clear why that is a 
fault. 
" This argument may be recognized as essentially an assignment of income analysis. His-
torically certain types of interest free transfers were employed to accomplish a temporary 
shifting of income from capital that should have been attacked under the traditional assign-
ment of income rules. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). The failure of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service to invoke those rules was in part responsible for the need for section 
7872. 
When (1) the transferee is not subject to tax upon obtaining the initial receipt and (2) the 
transferee is in a lower income tax bracket than is the transferor, my proposal would resur-
rect the pre-section 7872 potential for using interest free transfers to assign income improp-
erly. Accordingly, such gratuitous transfers would require scrutiny under the normal assign-
ment of income rules as do all other temporary transfers of capital among related taxpayers. 
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of the receipt, all of which must be repaid, constituted the lender's 
capital upon which a return should be paid. Professor Yin, how-
ever, consistently with the section 7872 approach, treats as the 
lender's capital only that portion of the loan that under bifurcation 
would be treated as the principal amount lent. 12 That definition of 
the "lender's capital" is purely arbitrary.13 As I argued in my arti-
cle, bifurcation simply does not reflect the economic substance of 
an interest free transfer and produces an improper income tax 
result. 
While bifurcation is not appropriate, Professor Yin's argument 
that interest must be present in non-simultaneous transfers does 
suggest another approach to the "interest free" receipt problem. 
The taxing system might require' that we look much harder for the 
existence of interest in fact. In many cases, that closer scrutiny will 
be to no avail. Contrary to Professor Yin's assumption, some trans-
fers are simply not interest bearing. When, for example, an interest 
free advance is made to a dominant shareholder in a closely held 
corporation, no value flows back from the shareholder to the cor-
,. poration in substitution for interest that is worth identifying. In 
other cases, careful case-by-case examination may disclose the ex-
istence of interest. In fact, such an argument could be made on the 
facts of Indianapolis Power. 
The implication of the argument that interest must be present is 
that the borrower is compensating the lender for the use of the 
receipt outside of their formal transaction through a transfer of 
goods or services. In Indianapolis Power it might be argued that 
the utility-borrower was transferring to its customers value in the 
form of making sales on credit to the otherwise non-creditworthy 
customer. The receipt of that service, in the nature of interest, 
should thus be currently taxed to the customer. Reconstructing the 
transaction to make it understandable (?), it is as if the utility paid 
interest on the deposit and the customer returned that amount as 
an increased cost of electrical service. The utility would have an 
interest deduction offset by an increased income froni sales while 
the customer would have interest income not offset by the in-
creased consumption expense. 
Whether it would be very sensible to search that hard for the 
11 See Yin, supra note 3, at 479. 
11 Professor Yin may not wholly disagree with this conclusion. See id. at 483, note 54. 
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existence of interest, and thus avoid the pattern of taxation that I 
propose, is questionable. Firstly, and in sharp contrast to the taxa-
tion of Abbie in my article (who obtained a conventional interest 
bearing loan), taxing the receipt does not prevent the recipient 
from funding the obligation to pay interest. The constructive inter-
est payment and offsetting receipt are entirely fictitious; they have 
no economic significance. Secondly, such a recharacterization is 
wholly unadministerable, as Professor Yin appears to recognize. 14 
Imposing an actual tax on the customers of Indianapolis Power is, 
to put it mildly, not feasible and suitable proxies for such a tax are 
not apparent. Therefore, if such an approach to interest free re-
ceipts were accepted in principle, the approach would not be ap-
plied in practice and the transaction would remain undertaxed. 
Nevertheless, if a receipt is offset by a repayment obligation that is 
in fact interest bearing, albeit in disguise, the receipt constitutes 
the proceeds of a loan and in principle ought not be subject to 
current taxation, nor should it be bifurcated. 111 
The bifurcation of an interest free transfer is an example of eco-
nomic analysis going astray. The creation of an interest substitute 
through a present value computation is intellectually satisfying 
and widely appealing. Unfortunately, it does not produce an in-
come tax result that is as consistent with the balance of the taxing 
system as does the simple taxation of the receipt. Accordingly, re-
ceipts that are only offset by non-interest bearing repayment obli-
gations should not be treated as loans for income tax purposes. 
•• See id. at 487. 
'" Professor Yin also observes that the pattern of taxation that I propose is not consistent 
with the requirements of a full current accrual approach to income taxation. That may be 
so. Under full accrual, many transactions would be taxed differently. However, under the 
existing tax system, unrealized gains and losses in assets or liabilities are not reflected for 
income tax purposes on a current basis. The annual increase in the burden of repayment of 
a discounted obligation would only be reflected for income tax purposes if that increase 
represented a built-in interest factor. However, if the transaction is an interest free loan (or 
other advance), the transaction will not coniain interest unless the transaction has already 
been bifurcated along the lines of section 7872. Professor Yin's criticism, therefore, either 
assumes the very point in dispute, that C's receipt should be bifurcated, or is derived from a 
concept of taxation that is not currently a part of our taxing system. 
